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Abstract - The recent change in the global economic 
environment produced a significant transformation in 
the conditions that affect managerial decisions. In fact, 
the increase in globalization led to higher managerial 
flexibility and a transformation in competition. 
Additionally, the financial crisis caused a lack of 
liquidity in financial markets. These circumstances 
originated a shift in the way investment opportunities 
should be analysed in global industries. Managerial 
flexibility can translate itself into expansion to other 
markets besides the initial ones. This possibility is 
analysed in the existing literature through real options 
analysis. In global markets competition is assured by 
global firms. However, the number of these firms is 
scarce. Therefore, global competition is made by a 
limited number of firms. This type of competition is 
analysed in the existing literature through game theory. 
The lack of liquidity in financial markets makes 
financing harder to obtain and exacerbates the conflicts 
of interests between the different stakeholders of a firm. 
Such conflicts are studied in the existing literature 
through agency theory. Therefore, a real options 
analysis under agency conflicts between equity and debt 
in the presence of competition is well suited to analyse 
investment opportunities in the present economic 
environment. The setting under which such analysis is 
performed considers two firms in a market that share a 
growth option to expand its scale of operations for a 
fixed investment outlay. The firms are financed by both 
equity and debt and the exercise of the expansion option 
is financed by an additional equity issue. Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium is considered and two alternative 
managerial policies are set: a first-best policy, which 
maximizes the value of the firm and a second-best 
policy, which maximizes the value of the equity of the 
firm. The results obtained with the numerical 
simulation performed demonstrate that agency costs 
exist in the presence of competition and lead to an 
underinvestment situation. 
 
Keywords - Real Options, Agency Theory, Game Theory 
and Capital Structure.  
1. Introduction 
The economic environment in which firms 
operate is in constant transformation. The growing 
globalization of the market economy affects 
managerial decisions and changes the paradigms 
under which such decisions are based on. In fact, 
globalization makes competition ever greater in a 
wide variety of economic sectors because of the 
easier access to other markets beside the internal 
ones. It also tends to make investment opportunities 
more flexible due to a broader applicability of 
technology to other purposes besides the original 
ones. 
Today, in many economic industries the focus of 
competition is set at a global scale. Globalization of 
the market economy makes competition transferable 
to a world level. However, the possibility to compete 
at a global scale is only accessible to a limited 
number of firms. Therefore, such general increase in 
competition also causes a difference in the type of 
competition global firms have to face. In fact, such 
competition is being performed by a limited number 
of firms in each particular industry. We are 
witnessing an increase in competition by global firms 
that compete among themselves in different markets 
and in different products. In this setting, models that 
take into account the impact of one firm’s decisions 
in the other firm’s behaviour are the ones that better 
adjust to this economic environment. Therefore, 
game theoretic models of competition gain a renewed 
relevance.  
At present, managerial flexibility is getting more 
and more present in investment opportunities. In fact, 
an investment opportunity, directed to a particular 
market, can more easily be replicated and developed 
to a broader one. In addition, technological 
breakthroughs can more easily be transferred to other 
industries. With globalization, access to external 
markets and the expansion of the initial concept to 
other realities is more easily performed. These two 
combined aspects lead to an increase in operational 
flexibility and highlight its present relevance. Models 
that incorporate such managerial flexibility are 
models that are best suited for today’s economical 
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environment. Therefore, real options models gain a 
renewed relevance. 
Additionally, at present times we are facing 
tremendous constraints in financial markets. The 
recent financial crisis affected immensely the way in 
which financial markets operate and their capability 
to provide the necessary funding to firms. This 
increased difficulty results mainly from a lack of 
liquidity in these markets. Among others, three 
consequences from this situation are worth being 
mentioned for the purpose of the present research. 
Firstly, the financing of investments is now a harder 
task than it was before. Secondly, the problems 
between the different stakeholders of the firm tend to 
be worse than before. Thirdly, it is much more 
difficult for firms to rollover their initial debt issues. 
Models that take into account these different, yet 
complementary, aspects reflect better the actual 
economic environment. However, we shall 
concentrate the analysis in the problems that arise 
between the different stakeholders of the firm. 
Therefore, agency theoretic models gain a renewed 
relevance. 
Despite the fact that the above mentioned effects 
are not all reflected in all industries, they are 
widespread in different magnitudes to different 
industries. However, for some particular industries 
they are all present. In fact, global firms which 
operate in markets where entry barriers do exist face 
all the above mentioned effects. They face a fearsome 
competition but only from a limited number of rivals. 
They generally possess high operational flexibility 
since they can easily proceed to other markets, hence 
they are global. They also possess technology that 
can easily be adopted by other industries, thus 
enlarging such operational flexibility. And finally, 
they also face financial constraints because of the 
lack of liquidity present in financial markets, which 
causes agency conflicts between their stakeholders. 
As a consequence of all these combined effects, 
a reflection about the new conditions that affect 
managerial decisions is necessary, namely, decisions 
concerning investment opportunities. With this new 
economic environment investment decisions are 
particularly affected. Higher economic uncertainty 
increases the risk associated with expected future 
cash-flows. Lack of liquidity in financial markets 
increases the cost of equity and debt financing. 
The focus of the present research is the analysis 
of the impact of the financing structure in investment 
decisions that present managerial flexibility in a 
competitive market. However, such model must 
depart from previous work developed in the different 
fields of research that are being integrated. 
Smit and Trigeorgis (2004) conclude that market 
structures portray an influence on the firm’s 
investment decisions. In a static approach to 
competition, it was shown that different market 
equilibriums, namely Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg, 
result in differences in the investment decisions of 
firms, and therefore, in firm value. In a duopoly 
setting, with both firms sharing a growth option and 
possessing an abandonment option, alternative 
competitive responses are analyzed. Departing from 
the monopolistic market structure as benchmark, the 
analysis derives the expressions for firm value under 
Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums. 
Therefore, it is examined how such equilibrium 
competitive responses influence investment decisions 
and firm value through the differences in firm value 
compared to the monopolistic market structure. 
Mauer and Ott (2000) and Childs et al. (2005) 
demonstrate that the exercise of growth options can, 
under certain financial structures, lead to an 
underinvestment problem, due to the existence of 
agency conflicts between equityholders and 
debtholders of the firm. In a typical underinvestment 
situation, equityholders decide to invest later in a 
project (with similar risk characteristics to the 
existing portfolio of investment projects) when 
compared to the optimal investment timing because 
the increase in the asset base will increase the value 
of the debtholders’ claims at the expense of 
equityholders. Rather than investing when it is 
optimal for the firm, equityholders tend to wait until 
the market evolves favorably and invest at a higher 
price of the underlying asset / project when the 
increase in value of the debtholders’ claims is not 
accomplished at the expense of equityholders. Since 
the debtholders claim is fixed, they cannot expect to 
gain more than seeing their claim become riskless. 
This can occur either by a reduction on the volatility 
of the underlying asset or by an increase of the asset 
basis of the firm. If the increase is due to an 
additional investment performed by equityholders, 
the debtholders will benefit from it without having 
incurred in any additional cost. On the equityholders 
perspective, whatever return their additional 
investment yields, it is going to be shared with the 
debtholders. They support all the costs and have to 
share the benefits. If equityholders wait to invest at a 
higher value of the underlying asset (project’s present 
value), debtholders will have already benefited from 
this increase and whatever return equityholders get 
from the investment decision, it will no longer be 
shared with debtholders. This explains why, in the 
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presence of pure expansion options, equityholders 
have an incentive to underinvest. 
Therefore, in the present research a discrete-time 
real options analysis will be implemented. The model 
must also take into account the existence of agency 
conflicts between equity and debt in a scenario where 
competition between two identical firms is present. 
Furthermore, it will be specified that both firms will 
act as Cournot competitors. 
2. Research Background 
In this section a brief review highlighting the 
fundamental research that relates managerial 
flexibility in the presence of agency conflicts 
between equity and debt and in the presence of 
competition will be specified. 
2.1. Agency Conflicts under Real Options 
Analysis 
In this section we will briefly review some of the 
most relevant articles that contribute to the study of 
the interactions referred to above. We will start with 
the reference to the main articles that refer to the 
interaction between investment and financing 
decisions until a central article that performs such 
analysis in a real options framework and conclude 
with the first introduction of competition in a context 
of managerial flexibility. 
The celebrated paper from Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) stated explicitly the indifference between 
different financing alternatives and the irrelevance of 
financing decisions to the market value of the firm. 
Consequently, it implied that firm’s investment 
decisions are independent of its financing policy. In 
fact, they demonstrated that given the firm’s 
investment policy and ignoring taxes and contracting 
costs, the firm’s choice of financing policy does not 
affect its current market value. Despite the huge 
breakthrough in financial theory that such recognition 
enabled, it left unanswered the observed practice of 
corporate financing policies. Later, introduction of 
corporate and personal taxes as well as assumption of 
bankruptcy costs led to the failure of the indifference 
proposition, so that the firm must choose an optimal 
financing method. However, under these 
developments, the independence proposition still 
holds. 
Later, Jensen and Meckling (1976) studied the 
impact that an agency conflict among stockholders, 
managers and bondholders has on the investment and 
financing decisions of the firm. They argued that the 
capital structure problem involves the determination 
of the entire set of contracts among the different 
stakeholders of the firm. Afterwards, Myers [9] 
argued that, in the presence of debt financing, a 
conflict of interests between equityholders and 
debtholders emerges. With this recognition, the 
financing structure is no longer irrelevant to the 
investment decision of corporations. 
Mauer and Ott (2000) studied the impact of 
managerial flexibility in the relationship between 
investment and financing decisions. In a real options 
and agency theoretic framework, they argued that 
levered equityholders of a firm with assets in place 
and owning a growth option to expand its scale of 
operations, have an underinvestment incentive 
whenever the growth option is solely equity financed. 
An underinvestment incentive is traditionally viewed 
as investing less than the optimal in order to avoid a 
wealth transfer from equityholders to debtholders. 
However, it can also be viewed as a delay in the 
optimal investment timing, which ultimately might 
lead to a reduction in investment. 
2.2. Competition under Real Options 
Analysis 
The initial model developed under this setting was 
Smit and Ankum (1993). Despite the intuitive 
presentation of fundamental aspects relating 
competition with investment possibilities the 
framework was not continued until Smit and 
Trigeorgis (2001). They analyzed in discrete-time the 
trade-offs between managerial flexibility and 
commitment in a dynamic competitive setting under 
uncertainty. In fact, they extended the framework 
developed in Smit and Ankum (1993) by explaining 
the source of firm heterogeneity and quantifying the 
trade-off between commitment and flexibility. 
Smit and Trigeorgis (2001) considered a scenario 
where two firms compete in two different stages of 
product development. Under this scenario, the early 
exercise of strategic investments can change later 
stages for the better. In fact, it can open new market 
opportunities or enhance the value of their investment 
options. Therefore, a firm can make a first-stage 
strategic investment possibly altering the later 
equilibrium strategic choices. Firms are initially 
assumed equal in the second competition stage but 
one firm may introduce some asymmetry by making 
this first-stage investment. Hence, the initial 
investment decision requires the firm to weigh the 
commitment cost against the expected future strategic 
benefits of commitment. For the different possible 
investment orderings considered, simultaneous, 
sequential or singular, it is defined a set of 
corresponding market outcomes, Cournot, 
Stackelberg or monopoly. These market outcomes are 
used to calculate the final payoffs. Following 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), the strategic effect of 
the committing first-stage investment depends on the 
type of competitive reaction and the nature of the 
commitment. The firm’s investment is either tough or 
soft. If firm (re)actions are strategic substitutes (as 
under Cournot quantity competition), the competing 
firm will engage less for an aggressive action by the 
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rival firm. Conversely, firms' (re)actions can be 
strategic complements (as under differentiated 
Bertrand price competition). Smit and Trigeorgis 
(2001) construct and solve four numerical examples 
illustrating all possible combinations of competitive 
reaction and the investment type. Upfront investment 
is only optimal for the first firm to act in the two 
cases where the strategic effect is positive. For the 
cases with negative strategic effect, the first firm to 
act should not invest. It should benefit from increased 
uncertainty as its stage-two investment option 
becomes more valuable. But at the same time 
uncertainty erodes the value of committing as the 
upfront investment becomes riskier. Smit and 
Trigeorgis (2007, 2009) use this framework to assess 
R&D strategies and infrastructure investment 
decisions. 
3. A Discrete-Time Agency Real 
Options Game Valuation Model 
In the present section, a description of the 
discrete-time model developed is made. Next, a 
validation of such model, with the use of a simulation 
methodology is also made. The results achieved with 
such simulation are presented and analysed. 
3.1. The Model 
With two firms present in the market, we must 
start with the consideration that both firms face 
exogenous uncertainty in future market demand, 
which is in turn characterized by fluctuations in a 
demand parameter. It shall be assumed a linear 
inverse demand function of the form: 
 ( ) ( )batt QQQP +−= θθ,  (1) 
Where tθ  is the demand shift parameter, 
assumed to follow a multiplicative binomial process, 
Qa and Qb are the quantities produced by both firms 
present in the market and P(Q) is the common market 
price as a function of total quantity (Qa + Qb). The 
demand shift parameter follows a binomial process 
and at the next time period it may increase by the 
multiplicative factor, u, or decrease by the 
multiplicative factor d1. 
 With this evolution in time of the demand 
parameter, the value of the firm at the end node of the 
demand tree can easily be computed. The end node of 
the tree shall also be considered as the maturity date 
1 The multiplicative factors, u, d, are exogenous to the model but 
the relationship between them is in accordance to the standard 
relationship established in binomial processes. The probabilities 
associated with such movements are the actual probabilities. The 
multiplicative factor, u, has probability q, and the multiplicative 
factor d, has complementary probability (1-q). 
of the options and the maturity date of the debt 
outstanding. However, it is necessary to obtain the 
value of the firms without including the decisions to 
be taken by the firms considering the exercise of the 
options and the debt payment. In order to do so, we 
must derive firm value under the equilibrium 
alternative to be considered, Cournot-Nash. 
The total variable production cost for a 




iiiii QqQcQC +=   (2) 
Here, ci and qi are the linear and quadratic cost 
coefficients. Therefore, the annual operating profit 
for each firm is given by: 
 
𝜋𝑖�𝑄𝑖 ,𝑄𝑗 ,𝜃𝑡� =  𝑃𝑄𝑖 − 𝐶(𝑄𝑖)
= �(𝜃𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖) −  𝑄𝑗�𝑄𝑖
− �1 +  
1
2
𝑞𝑖�𝑄𝑖2               (3) 
 
The value of the firm, assuming perpetual annual 
operating cash-flows thereafter, corporate taxτ , and 




−= 1iiV    (4) 
In order to obtain the reaction function of each 
firm under quantity competition it is necessary to 
maximize each firms profit function over its own 












  (5) 
Since both firms equally share the market, they 
achieve Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium 
quantities are obtained by equating both reaction 
functions. The end result is: 
( )( ) ( )












Simplifying the above expression, by setting
0== ji qq , we obtain the following expression 









  (7) 
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These equilibrium quantities generate the 
following firm value: 










V  (8) 
Having derived firm value under Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium, it is now time to include managerial 
flexibility. That is represented by the possibility to 
expand the scale of operations, exercising the growth 
option, and by the possibility to abandon the market, 
exercising the abandonment option. 
We shall start with the consideration of a growth 
option to expand its scale of operations. This type of 
option is typically assumed as an increment in firm 
value in exchange of the investment expenditure 
necessary to implement it. Therefore, it is like a call 
option on the increment in firm value with an 
exercise price equal to the investment expenditure 
necessary to implement it. The payoff at expiration 
date, for a call option with these characteristics can 
be represented by: 
( )0,IgVMaxG −=   (9) 
In the expressions above, I represents the 
additional investment outlay necessary to expand the 
scale of operations, G represents option value and gV 
represents the increment in the value of the firm. 
With the terminal value for the call option on the cash 
flows of the project above derived, the value of such 
option at a particular time is obtained by the general 








1  (10) 



























In the above expression, ( )κκ +1  represents 
the constant asset (dividend like) payout yield for a 
perpetual project (or firm). If we extend this single 
period binomial model and subdivide the time to 
expiration of the growth option, T, into n equal 
subintervals, each of length n
Tt = , the general 
binomial pricing formula can be represented as 
follows: 
 






























This expression adds the probability that the 
firm will take j upward jumps in n steps, each with 
risk neutral probability p. These jumps are in 
accordance with the evolution of the demand 
parameter considered in the demand function. 
It is now time to include the valuation 
methodology for the abandonment option. This type 
of option is typically assumed as a put option on the 
assets of the firm for the salvage value specified. The 
payoff at expiration date, for a put option with these 
characteristics can be represented by: 
( )0,VXMaxA −=   (13) 
In the expressions above, X represent the 
salvage value at which the firm can be abandoned, A 
represents option value and V represents the value of 
the firm. 
With the terminal value for the put option on 
firm value above derived, the value of such option at 
a particular time is obtained by the general binomial 











If we again extend this single period binomial 
model and subdivide the time to expiration of the 
growth option, T, into n equal subintervals, each of 
length n
Tt = , the general binomial pricing formula 
can be represented as follows: 
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0  (15) 
This expression also adds the probability that the 
firm will take j upward jumps in n steps, each with 
risk neutral probability p. Once again, such 
probability is in accordance with the demand 
parameter considered initially. 
With the two managerial possibilities present, it 
is now the time to develop the value of the firm after 
such flexibility is incorporated in the firm values 
derived. It results from the value of the firm obtained 
in accordance to the market equilibrium defined, 
without consideration of flexibility, with the addition 
of these two managerial possibilities the firm 
possesses. At the maturity date of the options, the 
value of the firm with the addition of the growth 
option is given by: 
( )[ ]0,1 IVgMaxVV G −−+=  (16) 
This is equal to: 
[ ]VIgVMaxV G ,−=           (17) 
At the maturity date of the options, the value of 
the firm with the addition of the abandonment option 
is given by: 
( )0,VXMaxVV A −+=   (18) 
This is equal to: 
( )VXMaxV A ,=    (19) 
Therefore, the value of the firm results from the 
initial value of the firm and these two managerial 
possibilities the firm possesses. At the maturity date 
of the options, it is given by: 
( )XIgVVMaxV GA ,, −=  (20) 
By substituting firm value as in the different 
market equilibriums considered, we obtain the value 
of the firm under Cournot-Nash as: 
 





























  (21) 
The value of the firm with the managerial 
flexibility present at a date prior to the expiration date 
of the options considered follows a similar path to the 
one described for the value of the options when 
considered in isolation. Therefore, it can be computed 
as follows: 
 






























After this computation, it is necessary to 
incorporate the agency conflicts that result from the 
additional equity issue necessary in order to exercise 
the growth option. Under the consideration that the 
firm is financed by both equity and debt, the total 
current market value of the firm, V, is the sum of the 
market value of the two securities. Therefore, 
DEV +=    (23) 
Where E represents the market value of equity 
and D represents the market value of debt. Under this 
scenario, equity can be seen as a call option on the 
assets of the firm. The exercise value of such call 
option is the value of outstanding debt. The maturity 
of this option is the maturity of the debt. Under the 
present setting, such maturity date is the same as the 
maturity date of the options considered. Therefore, 
the general value for the equity of the firm at debt 
maturity can be represented as follows: 
( )0,FVMaxE TT −=   (24) 
In this expression, F represents the face value of 
debt outstanding while ET and VT represent the 
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equity and firm value at the maturity date of debt. 
Being a call option on the assets of the firm, the value 
of equity at any date before the maturity date of the 
debt contract, can be estimated as: 
 



























0   (25) 
Furthermore, the value of debt can be obtained 
by deducting to the value of the firm, the value of the 
equity. Alternatively, it can be computed as the 
difference between the value of the firm and the value 
of a call option on the assets of the firm with an 
exercise price equal to the face value of debt 
outstanding. Therefore, it can be given by: 
( )0,FVMaxVD TTT −−=  (26) 
The end result of this perspective is: 
( )FVD TT ,min=    (27) 
The present value of this terminal value is 
obtained by the following expression: 
 



























0  (28) 
This is the general model that will be used to 
obtain the market value of the firm as well as the 
market value of equity and debt. However, with the 
inclusion of managerial flexibility and consideration 
of debt financing, we get additional results for equity 
and debt value under the different market 
equilibriums considered.  
In the presence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
without managerial flexibility, and applying Eq. (8) 
into Eq. (24), we get the expression for equity value 
as: 




















And applying Eq. (8) into Eq. (27), we get the 
expression for debt value as: 























When in the presence of managerial flexibility, 
the expressions for the value of the equity and for the 
value of the debt can be obtained by substituting Eq. 
(21) into Eq. (24) and Eq. (27): 
 
 















































































This set of expressions defines the model 
implemented in the present research. Additionally, 
the insight that determines the agency cost of debt is 
that two different policies shall be considered in order 
to exercise the growth option. The first-best policy 
considers that such option will be exercised in order 
to maximize the value of the firm. The second-best 
policy considers that such option will be exercised in 
order to maximize the value of the equity of the firm. 
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The difference in firm value that results from these 
two different policies is the agency cost of debt. 
For the first-best policy, the expressions are 
already derived, since they correspond to the 
maximization of firm value. Therefore, they are in 
accordance with the expressions derived for firm 
value. However, for the second-best policy, it must 
be noted that the expressions that were derived for 
the value of the equity of the firm do not correspond 
to the decision to be taken by firms that execute the 
second-best policy. The expression derived for the 
equity value corresponds to the value of equity that 
results from the maximization of firm value. It is not 
the maximization of equity value. Therefore, an 
expression for the maximization of equity value must 
be derived. The exercise of the option maximizes the 
equity value if firm value after exercise minus the 
value of debt outstanding and the value of the 
additional equity issue is higher than the value of the 
firm without exercise of the option minus the value of 
the debt outstanding. Under this premise, equity 
guarantees that the additional equity issue is not 
appropriated by the original debt. Therefore, the 
wealth transfer does not occur. Therefore, firm value 














       (33) 
With this policy, derivation of firm value in the 
different market equilibriums reached is obtained by 
the straightforward procedure of substituting the 
expressions for firm value in Eq. (33). The equity and 
debt values are also obtained by the incorporation of 
the firm value obtained in the expressions previously 
derived for the equity and debt value. With the model 
fully described it is now the time to implement it. In 
the next section we shall perform a numerical 
simulation of the model constructed in order to 
analyse the results achieved with it. 
3.2. Results 
The implementation shall be made with a 
numerical analysis performed through a simulation of 
a set of parameters. We shall start by the definition of 
all the necessary parameters to perform such 
simulation, after that we shall proceed to the 
numerical analysis ending with the main conclusions 




The numerical analysis to be performed assumes 
a duopolistic market where both firms share a growth 
option to expand the scale of operations and an 
abandonment option. Both firms have equal operating 
costs and it is further assumed, initially, that both 
firms will have identical financing structures and 
both firms will finance the growth option in equal 
form (through an additional equity issue). The 
necessary parameters in order to implement the 
model are the following: 
Table 1. Parameters  
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
θ0 17.50 Ca 5.00 
u 1.25 Cb 5.00 
d 0.80 F 50.00 
rf 2.000% X 0.00 
κ 8.000% g 3.00 
τ 25.000% I 50.00 
This set of values is an adaptation of the set of 
values that were present in Smit and Trigeorgis 
(2004). Furthermore, some additional values were 
adjusted to the present market and legal conditions. 
With this set of values, we shall proceed to the 
valuation of the firm. 
3.2.2 Results 
Under the scenario without flexibility we get the 
following values for the value of the firm, its equity 
and its debt: 
Table 2. Results  
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Va 118.49 Vb 118.49 
Ea 84.67 Eb 84.67 
Da 33.82 Db 33.82 
With the inclusion of flexibility under the first-
best policy, the values for the firm, its equity and its 
debt are naturally higher due to the existence, and 
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exercise of the operational flexibility. They are 
presented below: 
Table 3. Results  
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Va 317.03 Vb 317.03 
Ea 279.52 Eb 279.52 
Da 37.51 Db 37.51 
It must be referred that with the adoption of the 
growth option, the value of the debt increases 
significantly, 10.89%. The wealth transfer effect 
mentioned in the literature is also present in this 
formulation. The growth option is financed by an 
additional equity issue, but part of the benefits from 
such additional equity issue is transferred to the 
debtholders of the firm. 
In order to prevent such transfer of value, 
management adopts a second-best strategy. Under 
this strategy, the adoption of the growth option is 
determined by the maximization of the equity value 
of the firm and not by the maximization of firm 
value. The results achieved under this strategy are 
presented below: 
Table 4. Results  
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Va 305.91 Vb 305.91 
Ea 272.08 Eb 272.08 






It is clear from the above table that the value of 
the firms diminishes compared to the first-best policy 
firm value. The decrease in value is of 3.51% when 
compared to firm value with the adoption of the first-
best policy. This decrease represents the agency cost 
of debt as a result of an underinvestment in the 
growth option, consequence of the change in the 
strategy adopted to exercise it. The value of the debt 
decreases to the initial debt value (in the scenario 
without flexibility), becoming this way clear that debt 
is not benefited from the additional equity issue. The 
value of the equity also diminishes, when compared 
to the one obtained under the first-best policy. 
However, the “savings” in the additional equity issue 
possess a present value of 18.49. This reduction in 
the equity issue necessary to exercise the growth 
option is an increase in the value to the equity (in a 
global perspective, including the initial equity and the 
additional equity issue) that largely compensates the 
loss originated from the reduction in the exercise of 
the growth option under the second best policy. The 
computation of this additional value is necessary in 
order to establish the difference between the two 
policies considered. In fact, by adopting the second-
best policy, the firms exercise the growth option in a 
reduced number of branches of the demand tree. 
Therefore, the comparison between firm values in the 
two policies considered needs to include the 
additional investment in which the firms incur by 
adopting the first-best policy in comparison to the 
adoption of the alternative policy. 
The results obtained under Cournot-Nash clearly 
show that under the premises assumed, the agency 
cost exists and is significant. It leads to a reduction in 
the value of the firm as a consequence of the 
underinvestment situation caused by the adoption of a 
second-best policy. These results, under this 
equilibrium perspective are identical to both firms, 
since they equally share the market. 
4. Conclusions 
The economic environment that firms face is in 
constant transformation. At the present, such 
economic environment is characterized by higher 
operational (managerial) flexibility, competition and 
lack of liquidity in financial markets. This is the 
result of an increased globalization of the economy 
and of the crisis that affected financial markets. These 
events affect managerial decisions, particularly the 
ones related to capital budgeting. Therefore, a 
research conducted for the analysis of capital 
budgeting decisions under these new economic 
setting is extremely relevant in order to develop the 
current literature on the subject and to improve 
professional practice. This is the first conclusion to 
be withdrawn from the present dissertation. With the 
integration of three different theories into a unified 
perspective we aimed at an enhancement in the 
knowledge related to capital budgeting under 
competition and managerial flexibility, in the 
presence of agency conflicts between equity and debt. 
Such enhancement contributes to improved 
managerial decisions and therefore to added value in 
corporations. 
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In order to achieve it, we departed from a 
general approach to the problem through an analysis 
conducted on the fundamental literature on the 
subjects. The model developed was presented, 
describing the assumptions under which it was 
constructed. Later still, a numerical solution was 
implemented through a simulation set that enabled 
the extraction of results for analysis. 
In order to clarify the main results achieved, 
these are separated between reflections about the 
model itself and considerations about the outcomes of 
the numerical simulation implemented. Finally, 
remarks regarding future possibilities of research will 
be presented. 
The model developed departed from two 
previous works, one that integrated agency conflicts 
with ROA (Mauer and Ott, 2000), and another one 
that integrated ROA and competition (Smit and 
Trigeorgis, 2004). The first was in continuous-time 
and the second in discrete-time. Despite the 
widespread use of continuous-time models, we 
adopted the discrete-time perspective. This decision 
was based in the higher practical application of this 
type of models. In fact, the literature refers that one 
factor that might pose a barrier to the widespread use 
of real options models in corporation is the 
complexity continuous-time models possess. 
Therefore, the adoption of a discrete-time model can 
overcome such difficulty. On the other hand, models 
that analyse the interaction between investment and 
financing decisions tend to consider debt as 
“perpetual”, in the sense that the rollover of the initial 
debt issue is considered feasible, and continuous-time 
models are best suited for such assumption. The 
model developed in the present dissertation does not 
consider so. In fact, due to the current situation of 
financial markets we opted to assume that the initial 
debt issue must be repaid at its maturity date. This 
assumption reinforced the possibility to develop a 
discrete-time model, since under these models it is 
necessary to establish a maturity for the options 
present. Therefore, the analysis developed gains in 
tractably, is best suited for adoption in real life 
practice and is more in accordance to actual 
conditions in financial markets. 
The equilibrium conditions largely rely on the 
model developed by Smit and Trigeorgis (2004). The 
equilibrium defined is in line with Cournot 
Equilibrium and is, therefore, well established in the 
literature. The simulation performed intended to 
define a set of conditions that enables the 
achievement of results from implementation of the 
model. That simulation allowed us to understand 
better the managerial decisions taken under the set of 
conditions defined. In fact, concerning a competitive 
market with a shared growth option in which firms 
face agency conflicts between equity and debt, the 
model attempted to illustrate the decisions that firms 
should take. The results, for the numerical 
simulations developed, are conclusive. 
It became clear that under Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium an incentive to underinvest exists 
whenever the firm is financed by both equity and 
debt, and the growth option is financed solely by 
equity. A wealth transfer occurs between equity and 
debt. The solution to avoid such wealth transfer is to 
delay investment in the growth option, which 
generates a reduction in firm value.  This reduction in 
firm value is the agency cost of debt. 
The path followed opens a different perspective 
of research in this field. In fact, the model 
constructed can easily be reformulated to incorporate 
other possibilities besides the ones considered. 
Namely, the possibility of consideration of other 
forms of financing is open wide. In fact, 
consideration of alternative financing structures for 
the firms or for the exercise of the growth option is a 
logical and natural step. We replicated the financing 
conditions present in Mauer and Ott (2000). A 
replication of the financing conditions present in 
Mauer and Sarkar (2005) is a useful step that will 
generate relevant conclusions for this field of 
research. It can also be analysed the use of 
instruments of debt that could mitigate the agency 
conflicts present, namely callable or convertible debt 
instruments. 
Alternatively, other forms of equilibrium could 
also be analysed. In fact, the adoption of the Cournot 
equilibrium conditions was justified with the 
adoption of the assumptions present in Smit and 
Trigeorgis (2004). Nonetheless, other possibilities do 
exist that could be studied. A Bertrand price 
competition is a logical development, as well as 
Stackelberg equilibrium also in line with the 
developments in Smit and Trigeorgis (2004). 
Empirical testing of the present findings is 
another path that can be followed for the future. In 
fact, the testing of the present model could be made 
by its verification on oligopolistic sectors where 
innovation is present. Under ROA, empirical analysis 
is not yet very widespread. However, the validation 
of theoretical findings has a lot to gain with its 
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empirical confirmation. The theoretical findings 
reached in this research are no exception. 
The present research allowed the determination 
of the equilibrium conditions that might be present in 
competitive markets with shared growth options and 
abandonment options under agency conflicts between 
equity and debt. The comprehension of the factors 
that affect managerial decisions under these 
conditions is far from being reached, even because 
other aspects besides the ones here analysed interfere 
with those decisions. However, the breakthrough 
achieved in this research is one more step in the 
knowledge of those decisions. 
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